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AN EQUAL SACRIFICE SOLUTION TO NASH'S BARGAINING PROBLEM
by Zvi Ritz
Abstract
A new property of consistency for solutions of two-person
bargaining games is introduced, the property of invariance
under equivalent changes. It is demonstrated that when this
property is substituted for the independence of irrelevant
alternatives axiom among Nash's original axioms, it leads to a
new unique solution of two-person bargaining games, a solution
that allows equal amount of sacrifice by the two players.
1 . Introduction
The process of reaching an agreement through the act of negotiation
and bargaining is a well-established social and economic phenomenon.
In a bargaining situation the two negotiating agents are faced with the
problem: reach a unanimous decision—or suffer the consequences of
some pre-specif ied disagreement outcome. For example, if the
bargaining agents are the representatives of management on one hand
and the employees on the other in a labor dispute, then—in case of a
consensus—a new labor contract will be signed, otherwise the outcome
may be a costly (to both sides) strike. Because of their enormous
economic and social importance, the bargaining processes have
attracted a great deal of attention.
Nash (1950) was the first to formulate the bargaining problem
mathematically. In his formulation all the possible outcomes of the
bargaining process, including the disagreement point, are represented
as a set in the agent's utility space. This formulation enables the
reduction of the analysis of bargaining situations to a search for an
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outcorae that is agreeable to both bargainers or is considered a fair
outcome by an impartial arbitrator. This outcome is referred to as the
solution for the bargaining game. Nash's (1950) classical result was
that there exists a unique solution that possesses the independence of
equivalent utility representation, Pareto efficiency, symmetry and
independence of irrelevant alternative properties defined by him. A
striking aspect of Nash's solution is that it depends only on it's
relation to one point—the disagreement point. Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975) replaced Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom
with a monotonicity axiom and derived a unique solution that possesses
the properties they considered important. Their solution depends
crucially on three of the possible outcomes—the disagreement point,
the outcome most preferred by the first player and the outcome most
preferred by the second player. Perles and Maschler (1981) replaced
the same axiom of Nash with yet another requirement, the super additiv-
ity property, and also derived a unique solution. This solution
depends on the entire Pareto set of the outcome sets.
Here we consider a solution to Nash's bargaining problem that
depends on all the possible outcomes. We replace the independence of
irrelevant alternatives property with the invariance under equivalent
changes property and demonstrate the existence of a unique solution
that possesses the new property and also satisfies the rest of Nash's
axioms. This solution is the outcome that allows equal amount of
sacrifice to both players. This, by equating the areas of the sets of
feasible outcomes which one player prefers to the solution while the
other prefers the solution over them.
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Notations, definitions and some previous results are introduced in
section 2. The new axiom and the new solution are described in section
3 and are discussed in section 4.
2 . Notations and Definitions
A two-person bargaining game is represented by a pair (S,d), where
2
S is a convex and compact subset of R representing the feasible utility
payoffs the two players (bargainers) can receive under cooperation,
while d is an element of S corresponding to the disagreement outcome.
S is assumed to contain at least one other point x # d such that x > d
(x. > d. for i = 1,2), thus there are incentives to both bargainers to
negotiate, rather than settle immediately on the disagreement point.
Denote by B the set of all such bargaining games. Let 3 be the set of
all bargaining games in B such that:
1. For every x in S, x " d, and
2. If x is in S and d < y <; x then y is in S.
Let 3~ be the set of all bargaining games in B, such that: if
d < (u, ,u~) in S, then there is a pair (v., jV^) in S with v, > u, and
there is a pair (w ,w„) in S with w
?
> u„
.
2A solution to the bargaining problem is a function f : B * R such
that for any (S,d) in B, f(S,d) is an element of S.
For any bargaining game (S,d), the Pareto set P(S) is defined as
P( S) = {x in S | if y > x then y is not in Si
.
Let g Q and G„ be the
functions defined by
g
s
(x) = Max {y in RJ(x,y) is in P(S)}, and
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G
s
(y) = Max {x in R|(x,y) is in P(S)}.
Since S is convex and compact, therefore both g~ and G^ are continuous
raonotonic decreasing functions. (Notice that for games in B~
,
g and G„
are the inverse functions of each other.) For any bargaining game
(S,d), let I(S) = (I
1
(S),I
2
(S)) be such that I.(S) = Max{x.|x is in S}
for i = 1,2. I(S) is referred to as the ideal point .
We confine the discussion here to solutions which possess the
following three properties introduced by Nash (1950).
Independence of Equivalent Utility Representation (1EUR) ; For any
bargaining game (S,d) and real numbers a. and b. for i = 1,2 such that
each a. > 0, let the bargaining game (S',d') be defined by S' = {y in
R Ithere exists an x in S such that y. = a.x. + b. for i = 1,2} and
1 J i i l l ' J
d.» = a.d. + b. for i = 1,2. Then f.(S',d') = a.f.(S,d) + b. for
l 11 l ' i v ' i i ' l
i = 1,2.
Pareto Efficiency (PE) ; For any bargaining game (S,d), f(S,d) is
an element of P(5).
Symmetry (S) : For every bargaining game (S,d) such that d = d„
and (x, ,x~) in S implies (x
?
,x..) is in S. Then f,(S,d) = f
2
(S,d).
In addition to the above three axioms, Nash (1950), Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) and Perles and Maschler (1981) each introduced one
of the following properties as a measure of consistent behavior of
solutions over related games.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives ( 1 1A) (Nash 1950) : Suppose
that (S,d) and (T,d) are bargaining games such that T contains S, and
f(T,d) is an element of S. Then f(S,d) = f(T,d).
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Individual Monotonicity (IM) (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)): For
any two bargaining games (S,d) and (T,d) such that T contains S and
I..(S) = I.(T), either f(S,d) = f(T,d) or f.(S,d) > f.(T,d) for j t i.
Super Additivity (SA) (Perles and Maschler (1981)): For any two
bargaining games (S,d) and (T,d) and for every X, <_ X <_ 1, let
aS + (l-X)T = {Xu + (1-X)b|u is in S and v is in T} . Then
f(XS + (l-X)T,d)
_> Af(S,d) + (l-X)f(T,d).
Using the above properties the following results were derived.
Result 1 (Nash (1950))
There is a unique solution to the bargaining problem possessing the
properties IEUR, PE, S and IIA. It is the function N defined by
N(S,d) = x such that x >_ d and (x-^ - d,)(x2 - d 2 ) > (y, - d,)(y2 - d2 )
for all y in S such that y _> d.
Result 2 (Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975))
There is a unique solution that possesses the properties of IEUR,
PE, S and IM. It is the function KS defined by KS(S,d) = u such that
(u
2
- d
1
)/(I
1
(S) - d
1
) = (u
2
- d
2
)/(I
2
(S) - d
2
).
Result 3 (Perles-Maschler (1981))
There is a unique solution for bargaining games in B
n
possessing
the properties of IEUR, PE, S, SA which is also continuous. It is the
function PM defined by PM(S,d) = v such that
v q
J /-du,du ; = j /-du,du~
P v
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where p = (d, ,
I
2
(S))
, q = (I.tS^d-) and the integrals are the arc
integrals taken along the corresponding arcs in P(S).
As can be seen the Nash solution heavily depends on one feasible
outcome, the disagreement point. The Kalai-Smorodinsky depends on
three feasible outcomes—the disagreement outcome and outcomes (I,(S),d 9 )
and (d,,I
2 (S)), while the Perles-Maschler solution depends on the entire
Pareto set.
Thomson and Myerson (1980), while investigating different properties
that solutions may satisfy, defined the following twist property.
Twi s
t
: for any two bargaining games (S,d) and (T,d) and every player i,
if:
(1) f(S,d) is in P(T)
(2) x in T/S implies x.
_< f .(S,d) for j * i
(3) x in S and x. f(S,d) for j t i implies x in T, then either
(a) f.(T,d) > f.(S,d) or
(b) fjCT.d) = fjCS.d) and f.(T,d) < f.(S,d) for j * i.
(T/S is the set of all the outcomes which are in T but not in S.)
Since all the outcomes which are in T but are not in S are outcomes
which player i prefers to f(S,d) while the other player prefers f(S,d)
over them, and all the outcomes which are in S but not in T are out-
comes that player i prefers f(S,d) to them while the other player pre-
fers them over f(S,d), we may say that the bargaining game (S,d) was
changed in favor of player i with respect to f(S,d) when the game
(T,d) is considered. Thus the twist property states that a player
should not suffer in the final outcome, when a bargaining situation is
changed in his favor.
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The twist property can be strengthened as follows. A solution
satisfies the strong twist property if it satisfies the twist property
and in addition if S t T then either (a) f.(T,d) > f.(S,d), or
(b) f (T,d) = f
i
(S,d) and f.(T,d) < f.(S,d) for j * i. Thus solutions
-J J
which satisfy the strong twist are sensitive to any change in the
feasible outcome set which conforms to conditions 1, 2 and 3.
None of the solutions described above satisfies the strong twist
property. Consider the following example.
Example 1 :
2 2
Let S = jx in R+I x i + 2x ? -1 I2 and x i £ 4 ) ' T = { x in R+I x i + 2x ? -i
12 and 2x + x
? <_ 12} , and V = { x in R+ \x + 2x <_ 12 and x <_ 6} .
Consider the three bargaining games (S,0"), (T,TJ) and (V,"0) (0=(0,0)).
(See figure 1.) The Nash solutions for the games (S,0) and (T,0) are
identical, N(S,0) = N(T,0) = (4, 4), even though in order to obtain
game (T,0), only outcomes which player 1 prefers to N(3,0) and player 2
prefers N(S,0) to them, are added to the game (S,0). Similarly,
KS(T,0) = KS(V,0) = (4, 4) when again, only outcomes which player 1
prefers to KS(T,0) and player 2 prefers KS(T,0) over them are added to
game (T,0) in order to obtain (V,0). The same phenomenon, in which the
solution does not positively reflect changes in a game in favor of a
player, is also exhibited by the Perles-Maschler solution, since
PM(T,0") = (4, 4) while PM(V,o") = (3, 4.5).
(Insert figure 1 here)
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3. An Equal Sacrifice Solution
An underlying assumption for the twist property is that in order
to evaluate changes in a bargaining game a player needs a reference
point. The twist property is defined for the case where a game is
clearly changed in favor of one of the players with respect to this
reference point. The same assumption is used here for a more general
case.
To motivate the approach taken here consider the following
situation. Suppose two players after settling on an outcome, say x
n ,
as the solution for the bargaining game (S,d), are faced with (T,d) a
new bargaining game with the same disagreement outcome and which also
contains x
n
. It stands to reason that each player while assessing his
position in the new game will take into consideration the relative
value, when compared to x~, of both the set of new feasible outcomes
and the set of outcomes that were feasible in the first game but are
not in the second. To execute this evaluation we assume that each
player uses a measure of value which he attaches to the different sub-
sets of the feasible sets. We search for solutions which are sen-
sitive to any change in the bargaining game as reflected in the
players' valuation of the bargaining situation.
This approach can be stated formally for the most general case in
the following manner. Let M and M be measures defined on the class of
2
measurable sets in R . M. represents the measure of value used by player
i for i = 1,2. For any two bargaining games (S,d) and (T,d) and any
feasible outcome xn in SHT, let D..(x,J = jxlx in T/S and x. > x„ . } ,* li v l ' l Oi J
D
2i^ x(P
=
t
x
l
x in S//T and x
i
< x0i^ D3i^ x(P = f x l x in T^ S and xi * x0i''
and D,
.
(x ) = {xjx in S/T and x. > x~
.
} for i = 1,2. Notice that the
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addition of D.. and the deletion of D^
±
improves the position of player
i with respect to x~ , while the addition of D„ . and the deletion of
3i
D , . worsen his position. We say that player i prefers the game (T,d)
to the game (S,d) with respect to outcome x~ if M. (D,
.
(x ) U D
.
(x
n
)) >
l
<l(»3l(V UD*l ('0)) -
Let us define the following property.
General Invariance Under Equivalent Changes (GIUEC) (with respect to
measures M, and M~) : For any two bargaining games (5,d) and (T,d) in B,
f(S,d) = f(T,d) = u if and only if
M
i (0li(u)uD2 .(u)) = M.(D3i (u)uD4 .(u)) for 1-1,2.
Thus, two such games may have the same solution only if each
player perceives as the same the value of the set of outcomes that im-
prove his position and the value of the set of outcomes that worsen it.
In this work we concentrate on a special case of the above property.
We assume that both players use the Lebesgue measure m as their measure
of value for sets of outcomes. Namely we assume that the important
consideration for each player (or to an impartial arbitrator) is
whether he prefers an outcome to x^, and not by how much he prefers it.
Invariance Under Equivalent Changes (IUEC): For any two bargaining
games (S,d) and (T,d) in B, f(S,d) = f(T,d) - u, if and only if
m(D
1:
.(u)uD
2i
(u)) = m(D
3
.(u) uD4i (u)) for 1=1,2.
In addition, to simplify the exposition of the main idea we also
restrict all the following discussions to games in 3,
.
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Theoreni 1 .
There is a unique solution to each bargaining game (S,d) in B, that
satisfies independence of equivalent utility representation, Pareto
optimality, symmetry and invariance under equivalent changes. It is
the function C defined by C(S,d) = (c, jC^) such that c^ = g q (c,) and
Ii(S) I 2 (S)
/ [g s (x)
- d
2
Jdx = / [Gs (y)
- d Jdy
C
l
C
2
Proof .
To demonstrate that C is well defined, let (S,d) be any bargaining
game in B-, and consider the function M(x) = A, (x) + A^(x) where
x L^S)
AjCx) = / [gs (t) - gs (x)Jdt, and A^x) = -/ [g s (t) - d 2 Jdt
d
l
for d
1
< x <_ IAS).
Since go(x) is a continuous monotonic decreasing function of x,
therefore A, (x) is a continuous monotonic increasing function, while
A~(x) is a continuous strictly monotonic increasing function. Thus
M(x) is a continuous strictly monotonic increasing function of x when
d
1
< x < L.CS). Since M(d,) = A^d^ < and MCL^S)) 2 °> there
exists a unique point x„ such that M(x„) = 0, or stated differently
x I
2
(S)
A
1
(x
Q )
=
-A
2
(x ). Since A
1
(x) = / [gg( t)-gg(x) ]dt - / [Gg( t)-d 1 Jdt ,
d
l S S
(x)
choose c, = x„ and c
?
= g(x
n
), which completes the proof that C(S,d)
is well defined.
To prove that the solution C satisfies the independence of equivalent
utility representation property, consider two bargaining games (S,d)
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and (S',d') for which there exist a
J[
> 0, a
2 > q j t and b such that
2
S' = { y in R |there exists x in S such that y. = a.x. + b. for i = 1,2}
and d
±
l
= a.-d. + b. for i = 1,2. Let C(S,d) = (c, ,0 and let
c
f
= (ajCj + b,, a
2
c
2
+ b
2
).
1,(8") IAS)
Since / [g s ,(t) - d./]dt = a^ / [g g (t) - d 2 Jdt, andV c i
I
2
(S') i
2
(s)
/ [G s ,(t)
- d
1
'Jdt = a.,a
2 /
~ [G
s
(t) -djjdt hence
c '
*"
c
2 2
C(S , ,d') = (c
1
',c
2
').
C satisfies Pareto efficiency by definition and it is simple to
demonstrate that it satisfies symmetry. To prove that C possesses the
invariance under equivalent changes property, observe that the conditions
m(D (u)UD.,.(u)) = m(D,.(u) U D, .(u)) for 1-1,2
11 Zl jl 41
where m is the Lebesgue measure, can be restated as
u
1
u
2
I^T) I^S)
(i) / gT(x)dx - / gg(x)dx = / gT(x)dx - / gg(x)dx, and
d
l
d
l
U
l
u
l
a, u I (T) I
?
(S)
(ii) / GT(y)dy - / Gg(y)dy = / GT(y)dy
- /
L
Gg(y)dy.
d
2
d
2
U
2
U
2
If in addition u is both in P(S) and P(T) then (i) and (ii) are reduced to
I (T) I (S) I (T) I (S)
(iii) /
l
gT
(x)dx - /
1
gg(x)dx = / 2 GT(y)dy - /
2 Gg(y)dy.
U
l
U
l
U
2
U
2
It is simple to prove that C satisfies (iii). To prove the uniqueness
of C, assume that H is a solution for bargaining games that satis-
fies all the properties stated in the theorem. Let (S,d) be an
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arbitrary bargaining game in B, . Since H satisfies the IEUR property,
let (S',cT) be the bargaining game derived from (S,d) by changing the
utility representations so that d is transformed to d' = (0,0), and h =
H(S,d) is transformed to h' = (1,1). Let ~S' = {x in S' \x <_ x }, and
j3' = {x in S' |x, >_ x }. Since (1,1) is in P(S') and S 1 is a convex set
it must be the case that either [every x in S' is such that x, + x„ <_ 2]
or [every x in S_' is such that Xj + x
£
<_ 2] (or both). Without loss of
generality let us assume that every point x in _S' is such that x, + x
9
< 2,
Define T= \(x , ,x 9 ) in R~|such that (x 9 ,x.) is in S'|, and let V = S' UT.
V is a convex set, since otherwise, there exist y in _S ' , z in T and
< X < 1 such that Xy + (l-X)z is not in V and Xy
1
+ (l-X)z = Xy +
(l-X)z . This implies [Xy, + (l-X)z J + [Xy 9 + (l-X)z J > 2 or
X(y, + y 9 ) + (1-X)(z, + z 9 ) > 2, a contradiction. Thus (V,d') is in B, .
V is symmetric by construction therefore H(V,d') = (1,1) = C(V,d').
Since H satisfies invariance under equivalent changes it implies
(condition (ii) above)
I
2
(V) I 9 (S')
G
v
(y)dy - J
* Ggt (y)dy = / Gy (y)dy
-
J Gsl (y)dy = 0, and
I
P
(V) I
?
(S')
therefore / * G (y)dy = / G t (y)dy. But since C(V,d T ) = (1,1)
1 1
I (V) I,(V) n „.
*-v,«„ r 2 n f \j r 1 r \j • By constructionthen,
J 1
G
y
(y)dy =
J 1 gy
(x)dx '
I
:
(V) I
X
(S') Io(S') I^S')
/ gv(x)dx = / g s ,(x)dx, therefore /
' Ggt (y)dy = / g c ,(x)dx,
and hence G(S f ,d') = (1,1) = H(S',d'), which completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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Example 2 .
Consider the bargaining games (S,0), (T,0) and (V,0) defined in ex-
ample 1. Then: C(S,0) = (10/3,13/3), C(T,"o) = (4,4) and C(T,0) = (4.5,3.75)
4. Discussion
Solution C has the following appealing intuitive interpretation.
Consider a bargaining game (S,d). Regard all the feasible points x
such that x, c, as the outcomes which the first player "gives up" in
order to reach an agreement. In the same manner regard all the feasible
points y such that y 2 >_ c„ as the outcomes the second player
"sacrifices" for the sake of reaching an agreement. Thus C is the
solution that chooses the outcome that allows the same "amount of
sacrifice" to both players.
The IUEC property raises a number of interesting issues. It demands
that solutions to the bargaining problem be sensitive to any change in
the feasible outcome set. Will this lead to attempts by the bargainers
to cloud the subjects at issue by introducing essentially irrelevant
outcomes to the feasible outcome set? The danger that the bargainers
will try to manipulate the feasible outcome set once a solution con-
cept was adopted exists for all the accepted solution concepts. An
underlying assumption in the modeling of bargaining games (with
complete information) is that both bargainers know and agree upon the
feasible outcome set. Thus it is the legitimate privilege of a player
to use any feasible outcome as an argument in the bargaining process.
Is the IUEC property too restrictive and thus point directly
towards the solution C? Consider the following example of a class of
solutions. For any game (S,d) in B
±
let Ek (s,d) = (e^e^ such that
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e
2
= SS^
e
l^
and
MS) e
/ [g s (t)-d 2 Jdt -/
-L
[g
s
(t)-g
s
(e
1
)Jdt = k(e
1
-d
1
)(e
2
-d
2 )
e, d.
for -<» < k. < ». Each solution E, satisfies the IUEC property. For
example C = E
n
. Thus the set of solutions which satisfy the IUEC pro-
perty is quite large. The IUEC and the GIUEC axioms do seem to imply
solutions which depend on the measures used by the players. This is
not necessarily a drawback, since one should expect the outcome of a
bargaining process also to reflect the willingness of the players to
reach a compromise and their perception of the level of cooperation of
their adversary. A justification of this observation may be found in
the fact that in many bargaining situations no concensus is reached
because the bargaining agents perceive each other as uncooperative or
inflexible.
There are a number of interesting open issues which are not
discussed here. For example, the solution C possesses both the twist
and the strong twist properties—is this an indication that the IUEC
property is a stronger requirement than the strong twist property,
namely that every solution that satisfies the IUEC also satisfies the
strong twist property?
Also, in what manner should the C solution De extended to n-person
bargaining games, to bargaining games in B, to games with feasible
sets which are not convex? A different question is what other
measures lead to solutions which satisfy the general invariance under
equivalent changes property and what are their implications?
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Remarks :
1. Raiffa (1953) describes an iterative solution procedure that at the
end divides the feasible solution set into two equal area sets. His
solution is different from the solution described here. William Thomson
in a private communication indicated that he and a number of his stu-
dents discussed some of the properties of the solution derived here.
2. For a detailed discussion of the axioms and definitions presented
in this section, the interested reader is referred to Roth (1979) and
Kalai (1983).
Figure 1: The bargaining games (S,0), (T,0) and (V,0)
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